This article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections (...) to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean. RÉSUMÉ: Cet article pose deux questions sur le formidable livre de Robert Myers et Claudine Verheggen, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. La première question, qui concerne la première partie du livre, consiste à déterminer si, étant donné la supposition qu'un individu solitaire ne peut pas avoir de contenus mentaux, nous pouvons démontrer qu'ajouter un autre individu ne permet pas de résoudre le problème. La seconde question, qui concerne la deuxième partie du livre, est de savoir si un tenant d'une conception humienne des pro-attitudes plus sophistiquée, adhérant à la théorie de la décision, peut répondre aux objections formulées contre la simple conception humienne, et si Davidson n’était pas en fait un tenant de ce second type de conception humienne. (shrink)

Suppose that a physical duplicate of me, right down to the arrangements of subatomic particles, comes into existence at the time at which I finish this sentence. Suppose that it comes into existence by chance, or at least by a causal process entirely unconnected with me. It might be so situated that it, too, is seated in front of a computer, and finishes this paragraph and paper, or a corresponding one, just as I do. (i) Would it have the same (...) thoughts I do? (ii) Would it speak my language? (iii) Would my duplicate have any thoughts or (iv) speak any language at all? To fix the interpretation of these questions, I will take ‘thought’ to cover any mental state which has a representational content, where ‘representational content’ is intended to be neutral with respect to psychological mode. By 'psychological mode' I mean what distinguishes kinds of thoughts, such as belief, visual perceptual experience, desire, etc. Representational content, or thought content, as I will also say, determines the conditions under which a thought is true or false, veridical or non-veridical, or, more broadly, is satisfied or fails to be satisfied, independently of relativization to circumstances, possible worlds, or the like. Beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions, and perceptual experiences will all count as thoughts on this usage. The question whether one person has the same (type of) thought as another is the question whether both have a mental state with the same representational content in the same psychological mode. I will not count epistemic verbs, however, as picking out or expressing a (pure) psychological mode. Thus, although knowing that the time is ripe, seeing that there is a goldfinch in the garden, and remembering that my wife’s birthday is next Tuesday are all thoughts, they do not pick out the thoughts by using a verb that expresses a psychological mode. Therefore knowing, seeing or remembering the same things is not a requirement on having the same thoughts.. (shrink)

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology’s transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument — the Problem of Power-Seeking — claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pursuit of their goals. We review reasons for thinking that AI systems might seek power, that (...) they might obtain it, that this could lead to catastrophe, and that we might build and deploy such systems anyway. The second argument claims that the development of human-level AI will unlock rapid further progress, culminating in AI systems far more capable than any human — this is the Singularity Hypothesis. Power-seeking behavior on the part of such systems might be particularly dangerous. We discuss a variety of objections to both arguments and conclude by assessing the state of the debate. (shrink)

This chapter looks for “continuity and convergence” between Davidson’s and Wittgenstein’s work, identifies common themes and family resemblances, as well as disagreements, especially in the theory of meaning. I take up in turn: -/- (1) their shared rejection of the utility of an ontology of meanings; (2) a convergence on the idea that we must show rather than say what an expression means; (3) the similarities and differences between them on meaning as use and the sense in which rule (...) following is essential for meaning; (4) the publicity of language, first in connection with radical interpretation; and (5) then with Davidson’s later work on triangulation in securing objective thought. (shrink)

Qual é a relação entre uma razão e uma ação quando a razão explica a ação, dando a razão do agente para fazer o que fez? Podemos chamar tais explicações de racionalizações, e dizer que a razão racionaliza a ação. Neste artigo quero defender a posição antiga — e de senso comum — de que a racionalização é uma espécie de explicação causal b. A defesa sem dúvida exige alguma reelaboração, mas não parece necessário abandonar a posição, como muitos autores (...) recentes insistem. (shrink)

There are two main interpretive positions on Davidson’s project in the theory of meaning. The Replacement Theory holds that Davidson aimed to replace the theory of meaning with the theory of truth on the grounds that meaning is too unclear a notion for systematic theorizing. The Traditional Pursuit Theory, in contrast, holds that Davidson aimed to pursue the traditional project with a clever bit of indirection, exploiting the recursive structure of a truth theory to reveal compositional semantic (...) structure and placing constraints on it sufficient for its canonical assignments of truth conditions to be used for interpretation. This paper responds to a recent defense of a sophisticated version of the Replacement Theory by Gary Ebbs according to which Davidson was engaged in a Carnapian explication of meaning, intending to preserve only aspects of the usage of ‘means’ most important to us. I argue the Explication Interpretation cannot be sustained in the face of a detailed look at the passages that principally motivate it in “Truth and Meaning” when we take into account their local context, their context in the paper as a whole, and the context of that paper in Davidson’s contemporaneous work, and later work which tries to improve the formulations which he advanced in his early papers. (shrink)

This chapter identifies the central issue between Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson on the role of convention in language and argues they are not as far apart in the end as they take themselves to be.

This paper shows how one can respond within truth-theoretic semantics, without appeal to parataxis, to Donald Davidson's objection to the intelligibility of Paul Horwich's statement of the minimalist position on truth.

This is a review of Kathrin Gluer's Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction. A dispute about the grounding of the Principle of Charity is discussed, and some resources Davidson has for responding to a criticism of his theory of action.

Appeal to triangulation occurs in two different contexts in Davidson’s work. In the first, triangulation—in the trigonometric sense—is used as an analogy to help explain the central idea of a transcendental argument designed to show that we can have the concept of objective truth only in the context of communication with another speaker. In the second, the triangulation of two speakers responding to each other and to a common cause of similar responses is invoked as a solution to the (...) problem of underdetermination of thought and meaning by the patterns of causal relations we stand in to the environment. I examine both of these uses of the idea of triangulation. In section 2, I take up the use of triangulation as an analogy in connection with Davidson transcendental argument to establish that communication is essential for the concept of objectivity. I argue that it is unsuccessful because the case has not been made that scope for deploying the idea of contrasting perspectives, which is needed for the concept of objectivity, is available only in the context of communication. In section 3, I take up the idea that triangulation on a common cause of common responses of two creatures interacting with each other provides the additional constraint needed to assign objective content to our thoughts and words. I show that appeal to this sort of triangulation provides minimal help in responding to the problem it is intended to solve. Section 4 provides a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

Ludwig deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and, especially, the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another’s speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. The chapter is organized around three questions: What is the relation between rationality and thought? What is the relation between rationality and language? What is the relation between thought and language? Ludwig argues that some large degree of rationality is required for thought and (...) consequently that same degree of rationality at least is required for language since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. In answering questions and, Ludwig gives particular attention to Davidson’s arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech we lack the power of thought. (shrink)

This is a review essay on Carol Rovane's book The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism. I outline the main line of argument, clarify the central claim, raise some questions about some of the arguments, and suggest some limits on the extent to which one could see another's views as right but not accept them.

Donald Davidson has argued that attention to the necessarily public character of language shows that we cannot be massively mistaken about the world around us, and that consequently skeptical doubts about empirical knowledge are misplaced. The arguments Davidson advances rely on taking as the fundamental methodological standpoint for investigating meaning and related concepts the standpoint of the interpreter of another speaker, on the grounds that it is from the interpreter’s standpoint that we discover what constraints are placed on (...) meaning by the public character of language. In this paper, I argue that although Davidson’s arguments reveal important conceptual connections between meaning and belief on the one hand, and truth and interpretation on the other, they do not show that it is impossible that we are massively mistaken about the external world. (shrink)

This chapter reviews some of the history of discussions of logical form and offers a truth-theoretic account that traces back to Donald Davidson.

Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers of the last half of the 20th century, especially in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of mind and action. In this paper, I concentrate on a field-shaping proposal of Davidson’s in the theory of meaning, arguably his most influential, namely, that insight into meaning may be best pursued by a bit of indirection, by showing how appropriate knowledge of a finitely axiomatized truth theory for a language (...) can put one in a position both to interpret the utterance of any sentence of the language and to see how its semantically primitive constituents together with their mode of combination determines its meaning (Davidson 1965, 1967, 1970, 1973a). This project has come to be known as truth-theoretic semantics. My aim in this paper is to render the best account I can of the goals and methods of truth-theoretic semantics, to defend it against some objections, and to identify its limitations. Although I believe that the project I describe conforms to the main idea that Davidson had, my aim is not primarily Davidson exegesis. I want to get on the table an approach to compositional semantics for natural languages, inspired by Davidson, but extended and developed, which I think does about as much along those lines as any theory could. I believe it is Davidson’s project, and I defend this in detail elsewhere (Ludwig 2015; Lepore and Ludwig 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2011). But I want to develop and defend the project while also exploring its limitations, without getting entangled in exegetical questions. (shrink)

What is the ontology of collective action? I have in mind three connected questions. 1. Do the truth conditions of action sentences about groups require there to be group agents over and above individual agents? 2. Is there a difference, in this connection, between action sentences about informal groups that use plural noun phrases, such as ‘We pushed the car’ and ‘The women left the party early’, and action sentences about formal or institutional groups that use singular noun phrases, such (...) as ‘The United States declared war on Japan on December 8th, 1941’ and ‘The Supreme Court ruled that segregation is unconstitutional in 1954 in Brown vs. Board of Education’? 3. Under what conditions does it make sense to speak of a group doing something together, and what, if anything, is a collective action? In this paper, I argue that a) understanding action sentences about groups does not commit us to the existence of group agents per se, but only to the existence of individual agents; b) there is no difference in this regard between sentences which attribute actions to informal groups on the one hand and institutional groups on the other; c) collective action can be both intentional and unintentional; d) any random group of agents each of whom does something is also a group which does something together; e) while there is a sense in which groups per se perform no primitive collective actions, and therefore no actions at all, f) there is a sensible extension of talk of actions to groups, though it should be treated strictly speaking, like talk of group agents, as a façon de parler, for g) the only agents per se are individuals and the only actions are theirs. -/-. (shrink)

In this chapter, we defend the view that Davidson aimed not to replace the theory of meaning with the theory of truth, or to capture only certain features of the ordinary notion of meaning for certain theoretical purposes, but rather to pursue the traditional project of explaining in the broadest terms “what it is for words to mean what they do” through a clever bit of indirection, namely, by exploiting the recursive structure of a Tarskian‐style truth theory, which meets (...) certain constraints in an illuminating way, to generate theorems that give truth conditions for object language sentences that at the same time provide interpretations of them. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics was not intended to replace the traditional pursuit of providing a compositional meaning theory but rather to achieve the same aim indirectly by placing conditions on a truth theory that would enable someone who understood it to understand its object language. The chapter argues that by placing constraints on the axioms of a Tarski-style truth theory, namely, that they interpret the terms for which they give satisfaction conditions, and specifying a suitable canonical (...) proof procedure that issues in T-sentence that remove all the metalanguage semantic terms from the right hand side and draw intuitively only on the content of the axioms, we can use the theory to interpret object language sentences. It further argues that if we ask what body of knowledge one must be in possession of to interpret the language, it turns out to be a set of propositions about the truth theory but not the axioms of the truth theory itself. This shows how to avoid the problem of the semantic paradoxes and the problem of vagueness. (shrink)

There is a great deal of terminological confusion in discussions of holism. While some well-known authors, such as Davidson and Quine, have used “holism” in various of their writings,2 it is not clear that they have held views attributed to them under that label, views that are said to have wildly counterintuitive results.3 In Davidson’s case, it is not clear that he is describing the same doctrine in each of his uses of “holism” or “holistic.” Critics of holism (...) show a similar license. My aim in this paper, therefore, cannot be to provide and to examine a characterization of content holism that matches every use that has been made of the term. I aim rather to give a precise form to a holistic doctrine at one end of a spectrum of views that ranges from localism or atomism about content to holism about content. This view has the wild consequences often attributed to holism. While it is dubious that anyone has ever seriously held the view I characterize,4 some view like it seems to be what critics often have in mind when arguing against content holism. It is therefore worthwhile to make it precise, to distinguish it from other, related views, and to examine its internal coherence. Thus, in this paper, I will, first, clarify the doctrine, or a doctrine, of content holism, and, second, argue that content holism (so characterized) is not just false (which may be readily granted) but self-contradictory. To begin, we must distinguish between meaning holism and content holism. Let us reserve the term “meaning holism” for doctrines which are about the conditions for the possibility of linguistic expressions having meanings. Meaning holism is therefore a doctrine in the domain of the philosophy of language. “Content holism,” in contrast, we will treat as a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, about the conditions for the possibility of a thought5 having a content. By “a content” we mean, intuitively, what.. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend Davidson's program in truth-theoretical semantics against recent criticisms by Scott Soames. We argue that Soames has misunderstood Davidson's project, that in consequence his criticisms miss the mark, that appeal to meanings as entities in the alternative approach that Soames favors does no work, and that the approach is no advance over truth-theoretic semantics.

Let us call a thought or belief whose content would be expressed by a sentence of subject-predicate form (by the thinker or someone attributing the thought to the thinker) an ‘ascription’. Thus, the thought that Madonna is middle-aged is an ascription of the property of being middle-aged to Madonna. To call a thought of this form an ascription is to emphasize the predicate in the sentence that gives its content. Let us call an ‘x-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is x, (...) that is, an ascription such that the subject of the sentence which would express its content is x. Let us call a ‘self-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is identical with the ascriber. Let us call a ‘reflexive ascription’ a selfascription such that either (i) in the sentence the ascriber would use to attribute correctly the ascription to himself he would use the first person pronoun to refer to himself both as the ascriber and as the subject of the ascription, as in a sentence of the form, I believe that I ö. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as he (...) called them, ‘logical forms’. This portion of logic he called ‘philosophical logic’. Russell asserted that ... some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. (p. 53) Perhaps no one still endorses quite this grand a view of the role of logic and the investigation of logical form in philosophy. But talk of logical form retains a central role in analytic philosophy. Given its widespread use in philosophy and linguistics, it is rather surprising that the concept of logical form has not received more attention by philosophers than it has. The concern of this paper is to say something about what talk of logical form comes to, in a tradition that stretches back to (and arguably beyond) Russell’s use of that expression. This will not be exactly Russell’s conception. For we do not endorse Russell’s view that propositions are the bearers of logical form, or that appeal to propositions adds anything to our understanding of what talk of logical form comes to. But we will be concerned to provide an account responsive to the interests expressed by Russell in the above quotations, though one clarified of extraneous elements, and expressed precisely. For this purpose, it is important to note that the concern expressed by Russell in the above passages, as the surrounding text makes clear, is a concern not just with logic conceived narrowly as the study of logical terms, but with propositional form more generally, which includes, e.g., such features as those that correspond to the number of argument places in a propositional function, and the categories of objects which propositional.... (shrink)

Review of the three volumes of Davidson's papers: _Subjective, Intersubjective_, _Objective; Problems of Rationality_; _Truth, Language, and History_.

This paper advances a general argument, inspired by some remarks of Davidson, to show that appeal to meanings as entities in the theory of meaning is neither necessary nor sufficient for carrying out the tasks of the theory of meaning. The crucial point is that appeal to meaning as entities fails to provide us with an understanding of any expression of a language except insofar as we pick it out with an expression we understand which we tacitly recognize to (...) be a translation of the term whose meaning we want to illuminate by the appeal to assigning to it a meaning. The meaning drops out as irrelevant: the work is done, and can only be done, by matching terms already understood with terms they translate. (shrink)

This paper responds to a critical review of our 2005 book Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality, by Frederick Stoutland. It identifies a number of serious misreadings of both Davidson and the book.

The text is translated from the book by D. Davidson: Truth, Language, and History. Oxford University press, 2005.pp. 127-141.

This essay is devoted to the study of useful ways of thinking about the nature of interpretation, with particular attention being given to the so called normative character of mental explanation. My aim of illuminating the nature of interpretation will be accomplished by examining several views, some of which are common to both Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, concerning its unique characteristics as a method of prediction and explanation. Moreover, some of the views held by Davidson and Dennett (...) will be adopted, elaborated, and defended. The conclusions of these philosophers do not, however, form an acceptable whole. Thus I will attempt to moderate some of their views. In particular, I will attempt to show up the deficits of Davidson's view of the mental by defending the possibility some sort of psycho-physical reduction. Despite such philosophical pretensions, major parts of this essay will be devoted to sketching the foundations of a method for the interpretation of intentional behaviour which I take to embody the key features of our ordinary practice of interpretation. In particular, I will attempt to sketch the bases for a method of interpretation which is sensitive to the methodological considerations associated with the seemingly unique normative character of mental explanation. To this end, I will also investigate the question of how certain formal measures of coherence can be made to yield models for understanding the actual and possible bases of interpretation. (shrink)

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it (...) shows that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet. (shrink)

Despite Donald Davidson's influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson's failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply (...) cannot carry the weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson's attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Dans son récent recueil d’articles Language, Truth and History, Donald Davidson semble pencher en faveur d’une philosophie du langage mettant l’accent sur la notion de l’intention communicative du sujet parlant; en quoi il se rapproche du point de vue de Paul Grice. Si cela est juste, la pensée de Davidson se serait dégagée de l’approche sémantique formelle qu’il soutenait dans ses Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Dans cet article, je soutiens que, bien qu’il y ait beaucoup (...) de similitudes entre ces deux penseurs, Davidson n’a pas abandonné ses précédentes vues sur le langage. (shrink)

This paper presents a Davidsonian perspective on Derek Parfit’s disagreements with Nietzsche. I have actually gone further, too far perhaps, and tried to imitate Davidson’s attractive essayistic style.

D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp schemecontent distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On (...) the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptualabsolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world. (shrink)

This paper addresses criticisms of the concept of untranslatability which Davidson and Putnam have raised against the incommensurability thesis.

Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from (...) self-evident. A proper understanding of the role truth theories play in theories of interpretation makes the inscrutability of reference much less wide-spread than Davidson suggests, and, as a result, the radical interpretation methodology is much less likely to saddle its defenders with counterintuitive cases of indeterminacy than is commonly supposed. (shrink)

The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they have been focused too much on the truth-conditional notions of meaning/concepts and translation/interpretation in Tarski's style. It is exactly due to such a Quinean interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes that the very notion of conceptual schemes falls prey to Davidson's attack. We argue that what should concern us in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, following the initiatives of I. Hacking, T. Kuhn, (...) and N. Rescher, is not the truth-values of assertions, but rather the truthvalue-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories/languages does not lie in differences in determining the truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. The core of conceptual relativism does not consist in the claim that different conceptual schemes may yield incommensurable truth claims, but rather that different conceptual schemes may yield incompatible truth-value-status and therefore lead to distinct perceptions of reality. Conceptual schemes are no longer seen as sentential languages consisting of a set of sentences accepted as true, but rather seen as metaphysical presuppositions of presuppositional languages.[ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...) Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had contributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper devastated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descriptions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also argued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the definition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which superseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the mainstream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day. In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book "Explanation and Understanding". The second chapter did not deal with agency, but with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interventionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal explanation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”. One camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured. With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach contained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his followers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views. Von Wright’s book "Explanation and Understanding" was widely read and discussed in the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even Davidson did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the interventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s earlier book "Norm and Action". As is well-known, Davidson favoured an alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomological character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”. Davidson’s firm adherence to a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much interest in alternative accounts. [...] -/- . 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D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for (...) that language. In “Meaning and Truth,” Davidson proposed only that a Tarskian truth theory is a theory of meaning. But in “Theories of Me a n i n g and Learnable Languages,” he argued that the finite base of a Tarskian theory, together with the now familiar combinatorics, would explain how a language with unbounded expre s s i ve capacity could be learned with finite means ( Davidson    ). This certainly seems to imply that learning a language is, in p a rt at least, learning a Tarskian truth theory for it, or, at least, learning what is specified by such a theory. Davisdon was cagey about committing to the view that meanings actually a re satisfaction conditions, but subsequent followers had no such scru p l e s . We can sum this up in a trio of claims: Davidson’s Conjecture () A theory of meaning for L is a truth-conditional semantics for L. () To know the meaning of an expression in L is to know a satisfaction condition for that expression. () Meanings are satisfaction conditions. For the most part, it will not matter in what follows which of these claims is at stake. I will simply take the three to be different ways of formulating what I will call Davidson’s Conjecture (or sometimes just The Conjecture). Davidson’s Conjecture was a very bold conjecture. I think we are now in a.. (shrink)

Davidson’s account of singular causal statements as expressing relations between events together with his views on event identity lead to inferences involving causal statements which many of his critics find counterintuitive. These are sometimes said to be avoided on Kim’s view of events, in terms of which this line of criticism is often formulated. It is argued that neither Davidson nor Kim offer a satisfactory account of events - an essential prerequisit for the relational theory - and an (...) account of singular causal statements in terms of a modal sentential connective is advocated in place of the relational view. Such an account suffices to block the counter-intuitive inferences without needing to resort to a theory of events. It is suggested that a theory of events might be built upon a connective account of singular causal statements, but no such theory is presented here. (shrink)

La position résolument extensionaliste de Quine a été appuyée par des arguments de nature différente, dans ses multiples articles destinés à rejeter le projet de logique modale. On peut classer ces arguments en trois catégories : un argument naturaliste, où l’auteur tente de baser le langage scientifique sur une notation tâchée de décrire la “structure ultime de la réalité” ; un argument esthétique, où Quine fait allusion à des raisons de clarté et d’efficacité démonstrative pour privilégier la théorie des fonctions (...) de vérité ; un argument pratique, dans la mesure où Quine défend la logique classique sur la base du “principe de mutilation minimum”. A travers une étude de ses écrits relatifs aux attitudes propositionnelles, nous montrerons que la philosophie de la logique de Quine a prolongé la partie épistémologique de son oeuvre, optant finalement pour une stratégie de réduction naturaliste des intensions, à l’image du mouvement engagé par Word and Object et prolongé par From Stimulus to Science. Ce projet se soldera par un échec relatif, et Quine résumera cette désillusion par un fossé entre les structures du langage et du monde : la thèse du “monisme anomal” de Davidson sera le dernier mot, amer, du défenseur acharné de la logique classique. (shrink)

An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. (...) class='Hi'>Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 261-75. Davidson D., 2001, Essays on actions and events, Oxford: Clarendon. Farmer A., McGuffin P., Williams J., 2002, Measuring psychopathology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freedman D. A., Petitti D. B., 2002, „Salt, blood pressure, and public policy”, International Journal of Epidemiology, t. 31, s. 319–320. Greyson B., 2000, „Near-death experiences”, w: Varieties of anomalous experience. Examining the scientific evidence, red. E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynn i S. Krippner, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, s. 315-52. Judycki S., 1995, Umysł i synteza, Lublin: RW KUL. Judycki S., 2000, „Transkauzalność a determinizm”, Kognitywistyka i media w edukacji, t. 3, s. 73-86. Kawalec P. 2005, „Understanding science of the new millennium”, http://philsci archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002558/ Kawalec P., 2006, Jak odkryć przyczynę? Studium z ogólnej metodologii i filozofii nauki, Lublin 2006, w przygotowaniu. Kim J., 1998/2002, Umysł w świecie fizycznym, tłum. R. Poczobut, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Lauritzen S., 1996, Graphical models, Oxford: Clarendon. Menzies P., 2003, „The causal efficacy of mental states”, w: Physicalism and mental causation. The metaphysics of mind and action, red. S. Walter i H.-D. Heckmann, w druku. Pearl J., 2000, Causality. Models, reasoning, and inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piłat R., 1999, Umysł jako model świata, Warszawa: IFiS PAN. Rosenbaum P., 2002, Observational studies, Nowy Jork: Springer. Sabom M., 1998, Life and death. One doctors’s fascinating account of near-death experiences, Grand Rapids: Zondervan. Spirtes P., Glymour C., Scheines R., 2000, Causation, prediction, and search, Cambridge, MA.: MIT. van Fraassen B., 1980, The scientific image, Oxford: Clarendon. van Fraassen B., 2002, The empirical stance, New Haven: Yale University Press. Woodward J., 2003, Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation, Nowy Jork: Oxford University Press. Żegleń U., 2003, Filozofia umysłu, Toruń: A. Marszałek. (shrink)

O exame ultrassonográfico é uma ferramenta diagnóstica de grande relevância na rotina veterinária, uma vez que, apresenta ampla difusão entre os atendimentos de animais e permite a avaliação de órgãos e estruturas de forma não invasiva, segura e rápida, auxiliando na determinação de diversas afecções, levando ao tratamento adequado e contribuindo de forma positiva no prognóstico do paciente. Atualmente, em muitos casos, a avaliação testicular não faz parte da rotina ultrassonográfica em exames de ênfase abdominal, devido à sua localização anatômica (...) no escroto, podendo assim levar ao diagnóstico limitado e ao tratamento inadequado do paciente quando na ausência da avaliação dos testículos, posto que diversas são as afecções testiculares que podem acometer cães e que apresentam características ultrassonográficas de fácil detecção. Dentre as principais alterações observadas por meio da ultrassonografia, os casos de orquite, criptorquidismo, torção e também neoformações neoplásicas testiculares correspondem à maior casuística, sendo o método ultrassonográfico um exame com 98% a 100% de sensibilidade e acurácia para diagnóstico destas. Dessa forma, o objetivo deste artigo de revisão bibliográfica é elucidar a importância da avaliação testicular em exames ultrassonográficos de rotina, discorrendo inicialmente sobre os aspectos anatômicos e ultrassonográficos, e posteriormente acerca das afecções mais comumente diagnosticadas na rotina veterinária, apresentando ainda as alterações ultrassonográficas causadas no parênquima testicular. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Cães. Diagnóstico. Neoplasias testiculares. Ultrassonografia. -/- THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING TESTICULAR ASSESSMENT IN THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ABDOMINAL ULTRASOUND ROUTINE IN DOGS FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF TESTICULAR DISEASES ABSTRACT: The ultrasound examination is a diagnostic tool of great relevance in the veterinary routine, as it is widespread in the current reality and allows the assessment of organs and structures in a non-invasive, safe and fast way, helping in the diagnosis of various conditions, leading to adequate treatment and positively contributing to the patient’s prognosis. Currently, in many cases, testicular evaluation is not part of the ultrasound evaluation in exams with abdominal emphasis, due to its anatomical location in the scrotum, which can lead to limited diagnosis and inadequate treatment of the patient in the absence of ultrasound evaluation of the testicles, since there are several testicular affections that can affect dogs and that present ultrasonographic characteristics that are easily detected. Among the main alterations observed during ultrasonographic exams, cases of orchitis, cryptorchidism, torsion and also testicular neoplastic neoformations correspond to the largest sample, with the ultrasonographic method being an exam with 98% to 100% sensitivity and accuracy for their diagnosis. Thus, the aim of this literature review article is to elucidate the importance of testicular evaluation in routine ultrasound examinations, initially discussing the anatomical and ultrasound aspects, and later on the most commonly diagnosed conditions in the veterinary routine, also presenting the ultrasound changes caused in the testicular parenchyma. KEYWORDS: Dogs. Diagnosis. Testicular neoplasm. Ultrasound. -/- REFERÊNCIAS AMANN, R.P. Functional Anatomy of the Adult Male. In: MCKINNON, A. O.; SQUIRES, E.L.; WENDY, E.V.; VARNER, D.D. Equine Reproduction. 2nd edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Cap. 95, p. 867 – 880 ARGENTA, F.F.; PEREIRA, P.R.; CAPRIOLI, R.A.; VIELMO, A.; SONNE, F.; PAVARANI, S.P.; DRIEMEIER, D. Neoplasmas testiculares em cães no Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae, v.44, n.1413, p.1-6, 2016. DA SILVA, E.I.C. Anatomia e Fisiologia do Sistema Reprodutivo dos Animais Domésticos. Instituto Federal de Pernambuco. Departamento de Reprodução Animal. 2020. DAVIDSON, A. P; BAKER, T. W. Reproductive ultrasound of the dog and tom. Topics in companion animal medicine, v.24, n.2, p.64-70, 2009. DOMINGOS, T. C. S.; SALOMÃO, M. C. Meios de diagnóstico das principais afecções testiculares em cães: revisão de literatura. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, Belo Horizonte, v.35, n.4, p.393-399, out./dez. 2011. FELDMAN, E. C.; NELSON, R. W. Disorders of the Testes and Epidymides. In FELDMAN, E. C.; NELSON, R. W. (Eds.), Canine and Feline Endocrinology and Reproduction. 3 ed., St. Louis Missouri: WB Saunders Co. 2004. p. 961 – 977. FONSECA, C.V.C.V. Prevalência e tipos de alterações testiculares em canídeos. Dissertação de Mestrado Integrado em Medicina Veterinária. Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária. Lisboa, 2009. HECHT, S. Trato Reprodutivo Masculino. In: PENNICK, D.; D’ANJOU, M.A. Atlas de Ultrassonografia de pequenos animais. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2011. p.415-438. (shrink)

RESUMO A bovinocultura sempre esteve atrelada ao desenvolvimento do Brasil e, pensando no avanço, as exigências da máxima eficiência nos sistemas de criação foi pautada na forma de como conseguir realizar a reprodução de bovinos com ênfase na eficiência econômica e reprodutiva. O objetivo deste trabalho é elucidar as principais biotecnologias que auxiliam na maior produtividade reprodutiva de bovinos. Dessa forma, o estudo foi realizado usando artigos do banco de dados do Google acadêmico e SciELO, além de livros do acervo (...) pessoal e sites oficiais. Com o manejo reprodutivo aplicado na bovinocultura, é possível identificar pontos a serem melhorados e implantação de práticas que auxiliam no incremento da eficiência reprodutiva como a estação de monta, que concentra a fertilização dos animais em uma determinada época do ano, o uso do índice de escore corporal, o qual consegue determinar a viabilidade da vaca a ser fertilizada, e a identificação da idade a puberdade, na qual a novilha com 60% de peso vivo quando adulta pode estar apta para reprodução, indicando que a nutrição é um fator importante para reduzir o intervalo entre partos, bem como na indução da precocidade, que ainda pode ser maximizada por uso de bioestimuladores. Assim como a implantação do uso de biotecnologias, que podem adicionar aos planteis, indivíduos geneticamente superiores, saudáveis e eficientes. Dentre as biotecnologias, a inseminação artificial é a mais usada no Brasil, com capacidade de fertilizar vacas com sêmen de touros de genética superior, nacional ou importado. Podem ser citadas ainda as técnicas de transferência de embriões e produção in vitro de embriões como tecnologias a serviço do desenvolvimento da eficiência reprodutiva. A utilização de protocolos hormonais no ciclo estral objetiva a sincronização do estro das vacas para facilitar o emprego das biotecnologias. São vários os protocolos usados para essa finalidade, sendo Ovsynch a base de GnRH e prostaglandina com até 50% de eficácia, protocolos à base de estradiol e progesterona com eficácia de até 86,6%, e protocolos que usam gonadotrofina coriônica equina (eCG), indicados para animais magros por condicionar maior diâmetro folicular, o qual é relacionado com aumento na taxa de prenhez. Dessa maneira, as práticas e tecnologias citadas neste estudo são usadas na reprodução assistida de bovinos. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Criopreservação. Estro. Gestação. Hipófise. Nutrição. ABSTRACT Cattle farming has always been linked to Brazil’s development and, thinking about advancement, the requirements for maximum efficiency in breeding systems was based on how to achieve the reproduction of cattle with an emphasis on economic and reproductive efficiency. The objective of this work is to elucidate the main biotechnologies that help in the greater reproductive productivity of cattle. Thus, the study was done using articles from the Academic Google and SciELO databases, as well as books from the personal collection and official websites. With the reproductive management applied in cattle farming, it is possible to identify points to be improved and implement practices that help to increase reproductive efficiency, such as the breeding season, which concentrates the fertilization of animals at a certain time of year, use of the body score index, which can determine the viability of the cow to be fertilized, identification of age at puberty, in which the heifer with 60% live weight as an adult may be suitable for reproduction, indicating that nutrition is an important factor in reducing the interval between births, as well as in inducing precocity, which can still be maximized by the use of biostimulators. As well as the implementation of the use of biotechnology, which can add genetically superior, healthy and efficient individuals to the breeding stock. Among the biotechnologies, artificial insemination is the most used in Brazil, with the capacity to fertilize cows with superior genetic bull semen, whether national or imported. Embryo transfer techniques and in vitro embryo production can also be cited as technologies in the service of the development of reproductive efficiency. The use of hormonal protocols in the estrous cycle aims at synchronizing the estrus of cows to facilitate the use of biotechnologies. There are several protocols used for this purpose, with Ovsynch being based on GnRH and prostaglandin with up to 50% efficacy, protocols based on estradiol and progesterone with efficacy of up to 86.6%, and protocols that use equine chorionic gonadotropin (eCG), indicated for lean animals because they condition larger follicular diameter, which is related to an increase in the pregnancy rate. Thus, the practices and technologies mentioned in this study can help the assisted reproduction of cattle. KEYWORDS: Cryopreservation. Estro. Gestation. Hypophysis. Nutrition. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ALENCAR, M.M. Perspectivas para o melhoramento genético de bovinos de corte no Brasil. In: Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste-Artigo em anais de congresso (ALICE). In: REUNIÃO ANUAL DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE ZOOTECNIA, 41., 2004, Campo Grande, MS. Palestras... Campo Grande: SBZ, 2004, p. 358-367., 2004. ALVES, H.A.G. Otimização da produtividade económica e reprodutiva de uma exploração de bovinos de carne. Dissertação de mestrado em Medicina Veterinária no Curso de Mestrado em Medicina Veterinária, conferido pela Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias, 2014. AZEVEDO, C. et al. O protocolo hormonal ovsynch e suas modificações em vacas leiteiras de alta produção: uma revisão. Archivos de zootecnia, v. 63, n. 241, p. 173- 187, 2014. BARBOSA, C.F. et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo e diagnóstico precoce de gestação em vacas leiteiras mestiças. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 40, p. 79- 84, 2011. BARBOSA, F.A. et al. Produtividade e eficiência econômica de sistemas de produção de cria, recria e engorda de bovinos de corte na região sul do estado da Bahia. Arquivo Brasileiro de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 62, p. 677-685, 2010. BARBOSA, R.T.; MACHADO, R. Panorama da inseminação artificial em bovinos. Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste-Documentos (INFOTECA-E), 2008. BARREIROS, T.R.R. et al. Dynamics of follicular growth and progesterone concentrations in cyclic and anestrous suckling Nelore cows (Bos indicus) treated with progesterone, equine chorionic gonadotropin, or temporary calf removal. Theriogenology, v. 81, n. 5, p. 651-656, 2014. BARUSELLI, P.S. et al. Evolução e perspectivas da inseminação artificial em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 2, p. 308-314, 2019. BATISTELLA, M. et al. Geotecnologias e gestão territorial da bovinocultura no Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 40, p. 251-260, 2011. BERLITZ, C.G.B. Impacto do estresse ambiental na reprodução de bovinos de corte. Trabalho de Conclusão em Medicina Veterinária. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande Do Sul, 2019. BORDINHON, S.G. Aspectos gerais das fases de cria e recria de bovinos leiteiros. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso. Curso Medicina Veterinária, Universidade Federal De Santa Catarina, 2021. CAMARGO, L.M. et al. Influência dos escores de condição corporal e da heterose sobre os resultados da inseminação artificial em tempo fixo. Revista Eletrônica Biociências, Biotecnologia e Saúde, v. 10, n. 19, p. 7-16, 2017. CAMPOS, C.C. et al. Gonadorelin at the outset and/or end of an ovulation synchronization progesterone estradiol benzoate-based protocol in Nellore females. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, v. 37, n. 1, p. 173-181, 2016. CARNEIRO JR, J.M.; DE ASSIS, G.M.L. Objetivos e critérios de seleção em bovinos de corte em fase de cria. Embrapa Acre-Artigo de divulgação na mídia (INFOTECA-E), 2016. CARRIJO, M.S.; LINHARES, W.D.; BARCELOS, K.A. Descrição do manejo produtivo, reprodutivo e sanitário de 10 rebanhos leiteiros localizados em 7 municípios do estado de Goiás. Pubvet, v. 2, n. 28, p. 279-294, 2008. CASTRO, S.V. et al. Agentes crioprotetores intracelulares: características e utilização na criopreservação de tecido ovariano e oócitos. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae, v. 39, n. 2, p. 1-17, 2011. CEREZETTI, M.B. et al. Alternativas Para Substituição Do Uso De Implantes Vaginais De Progesterona Na Inseminação Artificial Em Tempo Fixo Em Bovinos. Revista de Ciência Veterinária e Saúde Pública, v. 6, n. 2, p. 416-433, 2019. CEZAR, I.M. et al. Sistemas de produção de gado de corte no Brasil: uma descrição com ênfase no regime alimentar e no abate. Campo Grande, MS: Embrapa Gado de Corte, 2005. COLAZO, M.G.; MAPLETOFT, R. Fisiología del ciclo estral bovino. Ciencia Veterinaria, v. 16, n. 2, p. 31-46, 2017. CONERA, VII. Manejo reprodutivo de bovinos: potencialidade e desafios. 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Transferência de Embriões nos Animais e a Indústria de Embriões no Brasil. 2020c. D’AVILA, C.A. et al. Hormônios utilizados na indução da ovulação em bovinos–Artigo de revisão. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 4, p. 797-802, 2019. DAVIDSON, A.P.; STABENFELDT, G.H. Controle do desenvolvimento gonadal e dos gametas. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária (Cunningham), p. 408-415, 2014. DIAS, E.A.R. et al. O uso de ECG influencia a taxa de concepção em vacas Nelore de diferentes condições corporais submetidas ao mesmo protocolo de IATF?. Boletim de Indústria Animal, v. 70, n. 3, p. 215-220, 2013. DYCE, K.M.; SACK, W.O.; WENSING, C.J.G. Tratado de anatomia veterinária. 4.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2010. FERNANDES, A.F.A.; OLIVEIRA, J.A.; QUEIROZ, S.A. Escore de condição corporal em ruminantes. Ars Veterinaria, v. 32, n. 1, p. 55-66, 2016. FERRAZ, P.A. et al. Dinâmica folicular e taxa de concepção de vacas Nelore sincronizadas com diferentes protocolos de indução da ovulação. Archives of Veterinary Science, v. 18, n. 4, 2013. FERREIRA, R.M. et al. Synchronization treatments previous to natural breeding anticipate and improve the pregnancy rate of postpartum primiparous beef cows. Theriogenology, v. 114, p. 206-211, 2018. FILHO, L.C.C. et al. Fatores que interferem na eficiência reprodutiva de receptoras de embrião bovino. Arq. Ciênc. Vet. Zool., v. 16, n. 2, p. 201-208, 2013. FONSECA, R.S. Manejo nutricional, reprodutivo e biotécnicas para incrementar a eficiência reprodutiva em rebanhos de vacas de corte. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade Federal de Viçosa, 2018. FONSECA, V.O. et al. Parâmetros reprodutivos de touros Nelore (Bos taurus indicus) criados a pasto, em de diferentes faixas etárias. Arquivo Brasileiro de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 71, p. 385-392, 2019. FONTES, A.R.C. Transferência de Biotecnologia. Revista Online de Pesquisa: Propriedade Intelectual, v. 2, n. 2, p. 98-110, 2019. GALVÃO, A.L.C.O. Fertilidade de touros e suas interações com fatores relacionados as fêmeas em programas de inseminação artificial em tempo fixo. Tese de Doutorado. Universidade de São Paulo, 2021. GOTTSCHALL, C.S. et al. Avaliação do desempenho reprodutivo de vacas de corte lactantes submetidas à IATF a partir da aplicação do GnRH, da manifestação estral, da reutilização de dispositivos intravaginais e da condição corporal. Acta Scientiae Veterinariae, v. 40, n. 1, p. 1-10, 2012. GOTTSCHALL, C.S. et al. Influência da indução à puberdade e do peso vivo sobre a resposta reprodutiva em novilhas de corte. Revista Veterinária em Foco, v. 16, n. 2, 2019. GOUVEIA, F.F. A Produção in vitro de embriões bovinos. Monografia (Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso) – Faculdade de Agronomia e Veterinária, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2011. GUASTI, P.N.; MONTEIRO, G.A.; PAPA, F.O. 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After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the (...) perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

This chapter introduces psychologism as the thesis that social facts can explained in terms of more basic facts about individuals, their psychological states, their actions, their relations, and their environments. It argues psychologism should be our default stance toward social reality. It reviews psychologistic approaches to shared intention and how shared intentions can help explain conventions, status functions, and organizations. It provides a deflationary account of corporate attitudes. It argues that neither physical nor social externalism about thought content are incompatible (...) with psychologism. It argues that social construction views of the self that conflict with psychologism are implausible. Finally, it points out that it is no objection to psychologism that social facts can change without changes in psychological facts because this is compatible with psychologism as explained here. (shrink)

There have been recent calls to expand contemporary analytic philosophy of religion beyond the oft implicitly assumed Christian tradition. Instead of exploring moral reasons to expand the discipline, I argue that there are strong epistemic reasons to favour diversifying the philosophy of religion. Increasing diversity is likely to increase disagreement, and there are epistemic benefits to be gained from the existence of disagreement. I argue that such considerations quite clearly apply to the philosophy of religion, and as such that there (...) are epistemic reasons to diversify the field. I conclude by offering a number of practical steps we can take towards achieving this end which are relatively easy to implement. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the Institutional Distribution Question for backwards-looking collective moral responsibility for institutional action, namely, the question how blame is to be distributed over members of an institution in virtue of its being collectively to blame for some harm. The distribution of blame over members of an institution for harms that the institution brings about must take into account the different institutional roles of its members. This is the primary difference between the question of distribution of responsibilities in unorganized (...) groups and in institutional groups. A central goal of this chapter is to say how and why this makes a difference. The two central organizing ideas will be that of a role that is a responsibility magnet, that is, one which attracts individual responsibility for blameworthy institutional action and that of a role which is, at least in certain respects, a responsibility shelter. In a responsibility shelter, the occupier of the role is at least provisionally innocent of blame for institutional action that is itself blameworthy, even when the agent in the role makes a contribution to it. What roles are magnets or shelters can be sensitive to the context and type of action the institution undertakes. The central theoretical tool in determining what roles are magnets and what roles are shelters is how collectively accepted proxy agent roles structure trust and responsibility burdens in an institution. (shrink)

How does one formalize the structure of structures necessary for the foundations of physics? This work is an attempt at conceptualizing the metaphysics of pregeometric structures, upon which new and existing notions of quantum geometry may find a foundation. We discuss the philosophy of pregeometric structures due to Wheeler, Leibniz as well as modern manifestations in topos theory. We draw attention to evidence suggesting that the framework of formal language, in particular, homotopy type theory, provides the conceptual building blocks for (...) a theory of pregeometry. This work is largely a synthesis of ideas that serve as a precursor for conceptualizing the notion of space in physical theories. In particular, the approach we espouse is based on a constructivist philosophy, wherein ``structureless structures'' are syntactic types realizing formal proofs and programs. Spaces and algebras relevant to physical theories are modeled as type-theoretic routines constructed from compositional rules of a formal language. This offers the remarkable possibility of taxonomizing distinct notions of geometry using a common theoretical framework. In particular, this perspective addresses the crucial issue of how spatiality may be realized in models that link formal computation to physics, such as the Wolfram model. (shrink)

I discuss the connections between rationality and intentional action, emphasising that different kinds of action are rational an intentional in different ways.

I respond to Ferrero’s comments on “What are Conditional Intentions?” in three parts. In the first, I address three arguments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine, the argument from requirement of a formal distinction, the argument from continuity, and the argument from the rational pressures of intention. In the second, I raise some problems for Ferrero’s views on the basis drawing out its consequences and testing those against cases. In the third, I consider in a more theoretical vein (...) how reasons and intentions are related, and offer an explanation of why we should not read reasons for intentions into their contents. (shrink)

This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...) collective action as a matter of all members of a group making a contribution to bringing about some event. I show that this is a mistake. I give a deflationary account of constitutive rules in terms of essentially collective action types. I then give an account of one form of constitutive agency in terms of constitutive rules. I next give an account of status functions—of which being a spokesperson is one—that also draws on the concept of a constitutive rule. I then show how these materials help us to see how proxy agency is an expression of the agency of all members of the group credited with doing something when the proxy acts. (shrink)